Slash and Burn Farming

In the late 1950s, Laos—one of Southeast Asia’s smallest and most remote countries—became an unexpected focal point in the Cold War. With the Geneva Accords of 1954 declaring Laos a neutral state, direct military intervention was forbidden. Yet the United States, viewing Laos as a key battleground in its strategy to curb the spread of communism, found ways to exert influence without breaking the rules. This influence began quietly, through covert programs like the Program Evaluation Office (PEO), designed to provide military support to the Royal Lao Army (RLA) while maintaining the appearance of civilian aid. Over time, U.S. involvement deepened with operations like Project Hotfoot and Operation White Star, laying the foundation for what would later become the Secret War. This paper traces the development of these covert operations and their impact on Laos, while examining the roles of U.S. agencies such as the CIA, Air America, and USAID. The Establishment of the PEO and Early U.S. Strategy in Laos (1954-1959) The Geneva Accords, signed in 1954, aimed to stabilize the region after the First Indochina War, declaring Laos a neutral state and prohibiting foreign military presence. However, the growing threat posed by communist insurgencies led by the Pathet Lao—supported by North Vietnam—prompted the U.S. to act. The United States viewed Laos as a vital buffer against communist expansion, and although bound by the accords, it sought ways to influence the conflict from behind the scenes. The Program Evaluation Office (PEO) was established in 1955 as a civilian-led initiative, but its true purpose was to provide covert military support to the Royal Lao Army. U.S. military personnel were embedded as advisors under civilian cover, offering training and logistical support. By 1959, Lieutenant General John A. Heintges took command of the PEO, tasked with transforming the RLA from a force reliant on outdated French colonial training to one capable of countering guerilla warfare tactics (Heintges, 1974). Heintges faced significant challenges, not least of which was the Lao army’s cultural hesitation toward violence, influenced by deep-rooted Buddhist teachings. Project Hotfoot and U.S. Covert Military Actions (1959-1960) By the late 1950s, it became clear that more direct military support was needed to strengthen the Royal Lao Army. The U.S. launched Project Hotfoot in 1959, sending U.S. Special Forces to Laos under civilian cover to train the RLA in modern counterinsurgency tactics. Though officially “civilians,” these Special Forces personnel played a crucial role in modernizing the RLA’s operations. However, despite the technical improvements brought by Hotfoot, the results were uneven. Many Lao soldiers remained reluctant to engage in combat, reflecting the cultural and spiritual beliefs that valued non-violence over aggression (Heintges, 1974). Project Hotfoot introduced guerilla warfare tactics to the RLA, but the program’s effectiveness was tempered by these internal challenges. The U.S. found that it was not simply a matter of training soldiers; the deeper issue lay in shifting long-held attitudes toward warfare. Heintges remarked that the U.S. efforts to militarize the Lao forces were often at odds with the soldiers’ own personal beliefs about violence, which shaped the dynamics of how the conflict unfolded (Heintges, 1974). U.S. Interference in Laotian Elections and Political Unrest (1959-1960) The U.S. role in Laos wasn’t limited to military support. The national elections of May 1960 became another avenue for U.S. intervention, particularly through CIA-backed efforts to support pro-Western candidates. General Phoumi Nosavan, who represented a staunch anti-communist stance, was a key figure in this effort. The U.S. believed that keeping Phoumi in power would maintain a stable, pro-Western government and help counter the influence of communist forces in the region (Heintges, 1974). However, the U.S. interference in the election had unintended consequences. Discontent within the Royal Lao Army, along with broader societal frustration, boiled over. Many in the RLA saw the U.S. intervention as undermining the sovereignty of Laos, which was meant to remain neutral under the Geneva Accords. This discontent culminated in August 1960, when Captain Kong Le, a young paratrooper within the RLA, led a coup that seized control of Vientiane, declaring a neutralist government. Though Kong Le initially sought neutrality, his government soon leaned toward communist influence, particularly from the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces, further complicating the political landscape (Heintges, 1974). The coup triggered a new crisis for the U.S., as Phoumi Nosavan—now outside of power—gathered forces to retake the capital. This led to a period of heightened U.S. involvement, with Washington increasingly focused on restoring Phoumi to power and reversing the influence of Kong Le’s neutralist regime. Operation White Star and the Expansion of U.S. Covert Operations (1961) In 1961, following Kong Le’s coup and the ensuing instability, the U.S. launched Operation White Star, marking a significant escalation in its involvement. Operation White Star expanded upon the foundation of Hotfoot, with U.S. Special Forces now taking on a more active role in training, intelligence gathering, and logistical support for the RLA. The operation sought not only to strengthen the RLA but also to directly counter the growing influence of communist forces in the region. Colonel Arthur “Bull” Simons led the White Star operation, directing U.S. forces to train Lao troops in guerilla tactics and to conduct reconnaissance on the movement of communist insurgents. Operation White Star marked a shift in U.S. strategy—no longer content to simply advise, U.S. forces began to engage more directly in the conflict, although they remained officially in the background (Heintges, 1974). Despite this increased support, the political instability within Laos—particularly the rivalry between Kong Le’s neutralist forces and Phoumi’s pro-Western faction—continued to challenge U.S. efforts to stabilize the country. The Battle for Vientiane and U.S. Support for Phoumi Nosavan (1960-1961) In December 1960, the conflict between Kong Le’s forces and Phoumi Nosavan’s pro-Western army came to a head in the battle for Vientiane. Phoumi, backed covertly by the U.S., launched a military offensive to retake the capital. The U.S. provided logistical support, intelligence, and weapons, ensuring that Phoumi’s forces were equipped for the fight. With additional artillery support from Thailand, Phoumi’s army successfully recaptured Vientiane, restoring him to power (Heintges, 1974). This victory solidified U.S. influence in Laos, but the political situation remained volatile. The battle for Vientiane underscored the fragility of Laos’ political landscape, with power shifting frequently between factions. While Phoumi’s return to power was a short-term victory for the U.S., it foreshadowed the deeper and more entrenched conflict that would follow. The Desire to Convert the PEO to MAAG During this period, there was debate among U.S. officials about the future of the PEO. Some advocated for transforming it into a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), similar to what had been established in other conflict zones like Korea and Vietnam. A MAAG would have allowed for a more overt U.S. military presence and a formalized command structure. However, the idea was ultimately rejected due to concerns over violating the Geneva Accords, which prohibited foreign military presence in Laos. Instead, the PEO continued to operate covertly, with U.S. personnel maintaining their roles as civilian advisors (Heintges, 1974). The Role of the CIA, Air America, and USAID in Covert Operations Beyond military training, U.S. involvement in Laos expanded through the work of the CIA, Air America, and USAID. The CIA, through its partnership with General Vang Pao and his Hmong guerrilla forces, provided vital support in the fight against the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces. The CIA’s covert operations helped strengthen anti-communist factions, and Vang Pao’s Hmong fighters became a key element of the U.S. strategy in Laos (Heintges, 1974). Air America, the CIA’s secret airline, played a crucial logistical role, transporting supplies, personnel, and refugees across remote and dangerous terrain. Meanwhile, USAID worked on infrastructure projects, building roads and airstrips that were ostensibly for civilian use but were often used to support U.S. military objectives. These projects enabled U.S. forces to move more freely across Laos, making USAID an important, if understated, component of the U.S. covert presence (Heintges, 1974). The Phasing Out of the PEO and the Aftermath By 1962, the PEO’s mission had largely been fulfilled, and U.S. involvement in Laos had grown beyond its original scope. As the conflict deepened, the CIA and U.S. Special Forces took on larger roles, and the PEO was gradually phased out. The operations that followed, especially the escalation of covert activities in what would become known as the Secret War, marked a new chapter in U.S. involvement in Laos (Heintges, 1974). While the PEO ceased to exist as an independent entity, its legacy lived on through the continued military and intelligence operations that followed. The U.S. remained deeply engaged in Laos, supporting anti-communist forces and conducting covert operations that would stretch well into the 1970s. ________________________________________ References Heintges, J. A. (1974). Interview transcript (J. A. Pellicci, Interviewer). U.S. Army Military History Institute, Senior Officers Oral History Program. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute.

Creating the Galen Beery collection

After the defeat of Japan in WW II, Japanese forces in Indochina surrendered, and nationalist movements rose to resist the return of French colonialism. In Laos, three brother princes, Phetsarath, Souvanna Phouma, and Souphanouvong, headed the Lao Issara (Free Laos) movement, which demandedfull Lao independence. Lo Fay Dang, Touby Lyfoung’s uncle on his mother’s side and one-time competitor for the title of Tasseng of Keng Khuai, immediately joined the Lao Issara. Although, Touby Lyfoung, along with King Sisavang Vong, felt that Laos needed a gradual transition to independence, under the protection of France. They felt that the achievement of an abrupt independence would leave Laos in a weak state, easy to be taken over by stronger neighbors such as Thailand or Vietnam. In October 1945, the Lao Issara formed a new government and attempted to dismiss the king. Prince Souphanouvong was appointed minister of defense. He formed a new army with help from the Vietminh and Chinese army. However, the Vietminh had to fight their own war with the French and the Chinese army had to retreat back to China, leaving the Lao Issara army alone to fight the French. In December 1945, the Lao Issara government in Vientiane sent an army to take over Luang Prabang and depose the king. It was supposed to join up with a Vietminh force coming from Vietnam. Before the two armies could join forces, Touby Lyfoung and the Hmong, Royalist Lao troops, and the French defeated the Vietminh force. Then they defeated the Lao Issara force, saving Luang Prabang and the king. By April 1946, the French had retaken control of Vientiane and Luang Prabang, and the Lao Issara had fled to exile in Thailand. In 1949, the Lao Issara split between Communists and non-Communists, and it was disbanded. The Communist faction, under Prince Souphanouvong, became part of the Pathet Lao (Lao Nation), close allies with the Vietminh of North Vietnam. The Pathet Lao was a subsidiary of the Vietminh. Its army was trained, armed, and led by North Vietnamese army officers. It fought side by side with North Vietnamese soldiers. In 1953, the French was defeated at Dien Bien Phu. Pathet Lao and Vietminh forces started moving into Laos to fight the French and Royal Lao government. These forces took control of eastern Laos and gained a foothold in the country. In the Geneva Accord of 1954, foreign forces were required to leave Laos, but the Vietminh never did. In 1957, a coalition government was formed, including the Pathet Lao, but it fell apart in 1959. For the next decade and a half, the Vietminh and Pathet Lao would go on to sign two more Geneva Agreements that they would break and the Pathet Lao would join two more failed Laotian coalition governments. Laos was too important for the Vietminh to let go, and the Pathet Lao was not interested in sharing the governing of Laos with anyone else. SOURCE: Lyfoung, Touby with Dr. Touxa Lyfoung. Touby Lyfoung: An authentic account of the life of a Hmong man in the troubled land of Laos.

My Hmong brothers and sisters, I know sometimes you feel powerless, don’t know what to do… You’re stuck in place with nowhere to go. Then I want you to remember this word: MOMENTUM. Our parents and grandparents were stuck on the mountains of Laos, subsisting on daily labors, backbreaking each day in the fields only to feed the family for the night, day after day, month after month, year after year. Then the U.S. and Thai governments saw us and said: Look how strong, how enduring they are, yet so ignorant of the world. We’ll use them as a sword to fight our war, as a shield to deflect our enemy’s weapons, as a wall to halt our enemy’s advance. We’ll call this: Operation Momentum. So we were conscripted, taught to read and write, trained to fight and fly, and we have been gaining MOMENTUM ever since, like a rock rolling down a mountain slope, like a river surging toward the sea… And here we are, from preliterate mountain tribespeople to nurses, doctors, teachers, superintendents, lawyers, legislators, builders, architects, actors, producers, and yes...poets, writers… in the mere span of fifty years. That’s MOMENTUM! So when you’re stuck, remember you are M O M E N T U M…

During World War II, Japanese soldiers who occupied Laos and Indochina let the French administrators and soldiers rule as they had for fifty years. These local French administrators were working for the French government of Marshal Petain, which was a puppet government of Japan’s ally, Germany. Japanese and French lived side by side until March 1945. On March 4th, French resistance soldiers under General De Gaulle flew from their base in India, parachuted into Laos, and contacted Hmong leader Touby Lyfoung. Touby Lyfoung was Tasseng of Keng Khuai, who oversaw sixty villages in Nong Het district. The French troops requested Hmong guides to help them in their effort to launch guerrilla warfare against the Japanese. They told him there were French commandos like them being inserted throughout Indochina to take it back from the Japanese. Touby Lyfoung agreed and provided Hmong men as guides for the French soldiers. On March 9th, Japanese troops took control over the country and tried to arrest and disarm all French administrators and soldiers. At the same time, there were nationalist uprisings throughout Indochina. In Laos, the Lao Issara (Free Laos) movement rose to resist French colonialism and declared Lao independence. At Nong Het, the local French commander destroyed his own supplies, hid his wife and children with local Hmong, and fled into the jungle to join the French commandos. On March 24th, three hundred Japanese soldiers passed through Nong Het, leaving thirty soldiers to man the Nong Het post, before continuing to the Plain of Jars. In April, Touby Lyfoung was arrested by the local Japanese commander and was asked if he had hidden the French weapons, supplies, and money. After three days of questioning, he was released, but he realized that he was in danger, so he fled with his family and relatives into the jungle. While Touby Lyfoung was hiding in the jungle, Lo Fay Dang, Touby Lyfoung’s uncle and one-time competitor for Tasseng of Keng Khuai, was put in charge at Nong Het. Lo Fay Dang did not like the French and was well-connected to the Japanese. When Touby Lyfoung heard that Lo Fay Dang’s men and Japanese soldiers were torturing his relatives for information, he fled even deeper into the jungle, where he and his family remained for four months. Lyfoung, Touby with Dr. Touxa Lyfoung. Touby Lyfoung: An authentic account of the life of a Hmong man in the troubled land of Laos. Piece written by: Soul Vang

THE POLITICS OF OPIUM For the Hmong, the main aim of poppy cultivation has always been commercial. It is the ideal crop that could be sold for cash, especially silver bars and coins in the old days before paper money came into use. How much yield a grower gets each year depends on the quality of the soil, the size and altitude of the field, and how many workers a household has. Apart from cash, opium is exchanged for necessities such as salt and clothing materials. Some is used for smoking by village addicts, but their number is usually very low due to strong social stigma against opium addiction in Hmong society. Sometimes, it is used as poison to commit suicide, especially by Hmong women, but it is never used as part of Hmong rituals like rice or domestic animals. Until the 1950’s before the advent of cars and roads, which made it possible to go to markets at the nearest towns, Chinese trading caravans used to sell goods to remote Hmong villages, using horses as transport. The Hmong, in turn, sold or exchanged their opium to these caravanners so that growers had no need to travel anywhere to sell their opium. For this reason, Hmong who migrated to Laos from China often settled along these trading routes. In fact, there are stories about young Hmong men (e.g. Touby Lyfoung’s grand-father) who migrated south, while serving as porters for Chinese traders. After making Laos a “protectorate” of France in October 1893, the French levied a head tax (se taub hau neeg) on all male residents of the country, ages between 19 and 60, to fund operations. For the Lao in the lowlands, this tax was set at 2 piastres (2 txiaj kis) per person per year (payable in cash or kind e.g. domestic animals), along with 20 days of corvee or free labour given to the authorities. For the Khamu, Hmong and other minorities, it was one piaster and 10 days of free labour. In 1896, this tax was increased and payable only in cash. The problem for the Hmong was that Lao local officials/princes also collected their own taxes. In addition, Hmong chiefs who acted as tax collectors for the Lao and French authorities also levied their own tax and corvee labour to get their own money and to have village people doing farm work for them. All these different levels of taxation and corruption greatly inflated the amount of taxes people had to pay each year. Many of the poorer Hmong could not pay, and there are stories of some having to sell or pawn children to richer Hmong to borrow money for their tax obligations. Due to this financial burden, the Hmong had to increase their opium cultivation as the only means to get money to pay for their family needs and their taxes. Even those who previously did not grow opium now had to do it. The impact of this severe official taxation is that the Hmong rose up in rebellion known as RogVwm or “Mad Men’s War” under the leadership of Pachay Vue (Paj Cai Vwj). Aided by Hmong messianic beliefs, the rebellion lasted from 1918 to 1921 – starting first in Vietnam and quickly spreading to all of northern Laos. The French had to bring colonial troops from other parts of Indochina to put it down. Today, Pachay is still celebrated by the Hmong of Laos and Vietnam as a revolutionary hero. In 1947, the first Hmong deputy elected from Xieng Khouang to the Lao National Assembly in Vientiane, Mr Toulia Lyfoung, lobbied against this head tax and it was abolished, thus finally releasing the Hmong and other Lao citizens of this heavy burden. HOW THE POPPY IS GROWN In the traditional Hmong economy, no family would grow only one kind of crop as this would not meet all the family’s needs. Rice grows best in lower altitudes, so rice fields are often located lower down the mountain slope, away from maize and poppy fields. If a family grows all three major crops, then rice, maize and opium would be integrated into the annual farming cycle. Each family would give equal attention to them, although, the labor requirement may differ from one crop to another. Rice and opium has been found to need the same labor intensity (about 220 mandays per hectare), with maize about one two thirds less (80 mandays/hectare). Maize (or corn) and poppy usually share the same field as both are suited for the same soil, altitude and weather conditions, with maize being grown first. All fields are worked by hands as they are often too steep and growers have no machinery to use. The scheduling of labour for each crop depends on the weather and how many workers are available. Maize fields (teb pob kws) are cleared (luaj teb) in January and February, followed by burning (hlawv teb) in March. Maize planting (cog pob kws) takes place in April, and weeding (dob nroj) in May. The first corn cobs are harvested (ntais pob kws) in June-July, and by September all harvesting should be completed. August sees the preparation of the maize fields for poppy growing, starting with hoeing (faus teb yeeb) – turning up every inch of the soil manually with a hoe (hlau) and burying the dry maize stalks and weeds under. Early sowing of the poppy seeds (tseb yeeb) begins in September and should finish by October, a time when the Hmong are also busy harvesting rice. November and December are spent weeding (dob yeeb) the poppy seedlings and young plants, a time when the Hmong also celebrate the New Year. Using a three-bladed small knife (riam yeeb), workers will tap the opium pods (hlais yeeb) and collect their sap (sau yeeb) with a scraping blade (duav yeeb) in January and February. Once collected, the sap (yeeb nyoos) from all the tappings is put together in a small container and allowed to dry. The year’s harvest is then wrapped in bamboo papers to be stored for safe-keeping and sale. The process completes with growers collecting poppy seeds (muab noob yeeb) in March to be used for the following year, and the next cycle of cultivation starts all over once more. D. Feingold, “Opium and Politics in Laos”, in N. S. Adams and A. W. McCoy eds. Laos: War and Revolution (NY: Harper Colophon Books, 1970), p. 329. Although they grow the drug, less than 10% of the Hmong are addicted to opium,. See J. Westermeyer, “Use of Alcohol and Opium by the Meo of Laos”, American Journal of Psychiatry, 1971, 127 (8), p.1021. G. Evans, A Short History of Laos, the Land in Between (Crows Nest: Allen and Unwin, 2002), p. 46. M. Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 32